And what it means for the future of Europe
The Lancaster House meeting in London in early March provided a show of unity among European countries and other friendly nations. There was a commitment to support Ukraine in its fight against Russian invasion and occupation and a seeming determination to step up defence capabilities in the face of the seeming unreliability of the US defence umbrella.
Since then, there have been significant statements around plans to increase defence expenditures substantially and to coordinate defence capabilities across a number of countries. The amounts being talked about are eye-watering. Many hurdles remain to be overcome not least finding the money, being able to get commitment across fragmented national parliaments, and how to sustain such expenditures over time. Bond markets are already jittery. Taxes are high across Europe and government expenditures already account for nearly half of GDP. Eurobonds may provide a thin veneer of respectability, but they are still debt. They don’t solve the problem of debt sustainability and it’s not clear how the EU can ever pay back the joint debt it has already taken on.
Nevertheless, there seems little doubt that there is the political will to step up. The issues have become existential for Europe and, maybe, for the future of democracy and the rule of law more broadly. A way will have to be found.
Europe was warned of the need to step up to secure its own defence and security during President Trump’s first term. Some countries, like Poland and the Baltic States, being in the eye of the storm, took the warning seriously and stepped up. Others did not, maybe hoping it would all be a transient phenomenon and we could all get back to business-as-usual post-Trump. It seems that many find it difficult to change unless they are in a choke hold with a loaded gun held to their head.
That gun is here, and it’s well loaded – as shown by the temporary withdrawal of US arms shipments and intelligence provision in Ukraine. It seems sleeping giants can, after all, awake when the threat is clear and visible.
One of the most important elements of the meeting and of subsequent events is the ready embrace of the idea of a ‘coalition of the willing.’ It is abundantly clear that EU Member States cannot, on their own, provide European security and a credible defence capability. Hence the openness to a coalition of the willing to include others – the UK, Canada, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand…
UK Prime Minster Keir Starmer has been collaborating with French President Macron, to build a coalition of thirty or so Western countries. Chancellor Olaf Scholz was quoted as saying “It is very important to us that the projects that can be supported with this are open to . . . countries that are not part of the European Union but work closely together, such as Great Britain, Norway, Switzerland or Turkey,” Chancellor elect Merz said that, in this context, Brexit was an irrelevance.
Some resistance is inevitable with President Macron stating that “European [apparently meaning EU] orders should be prioritised” when looking at procurement.
Yet, the taboo is breaking. The fact that the EU cannot, on its own, provide an adequate defence and security shield is staring everyone in the face. As is the fact that some EU Member States will refuse to step up or will even act as blockers for various reasons – either because of their neutrality clause or because their sympathies lie elsewhere. The coalition of the willing is likely here to stay.
What happens in defence needn’t stay in defence
In a December 2022 report for the RADIX Centre for Business, Politics & Society, we wrote:
“Europe has the potential to succeed. Doing so will require a broad coalition [of the willing] that includes the European Commission, some EU Member States, and those European countries that can bring strength to the initiative. This is what we understand by the stated desire for Open Strategic Autonomy.”
We wrote this in the context of how Europe could become competitive in the field of digital finance where non-EU countries such as the UK and Switzerland had much to offer.
Needless to say, our suggestion got no traction. Europe was not ready.
In an outstanding speech, French Senator Claude Malhuret put it like this: “Europe will only become a military power again by becoming an industrial power once more.” We are not there yet, but the realisation will come, as it has in defence, that a EU that is self-focused and closed within itself has almost zero chance of becoming an industrial power once more. It has insufficient skills and capabilities and an unsatisfactory level of cohesion between Member States leading to decision making processes are too slow, too ponderous and too uncertain for today’s fast-moving world.
Some prefer to ‘solve’ this issue by making majority voting the norm across all areas of policy. This is short-sighted. Majority voting forces some Member States to implement policies that they and their voters do not support. This generates resentment and further opens the door to the usual cry of ‘it’s not me, it’s the EU that’s forcing me to do this.’ It is likely that what majority voting already exists has played some part in the rise of Eurosceptic parties across much of the Union. More of that is the last thing that Europe needs.
Further, EU Member States are already far behind in much of the technology and capabilities that underpin a successful 21st century economy. They will benefit from collaboration with other nations that can bring know-how and proficiencies to the party.
There is little doubt that Europe has now been punching below its weight for far too long – economically and in terms of defence and security. This has to stop.
For that to happen, the EU must lead an open continent. Collaborating widely with like-minded friends and allies across the globe – from those on its doorstep like the UK and Switzerland, to Canada, to Japan and S Korea, to Australia and New Zealand. And it must do so flexibly through a variable architecture of coalitions of the willing rather than a one-size-fits-all model. Such wide-ranging collaborations on the economic, industrial and defence fronts would allow Europe to project its hard and soft powers widely, become more resilient and build a collaborative network spanning the globe. It could provide more fuel for global trade in Euros as an emerging reserve currency.
It opens up the potential to match the US (or even supplant it depending on how much damage President Trump manages to inflict on his country) as the leader of the Western world. Defending and sustaining liberal democratic values based on increasing prosperity and backed up by credible hard power. This route is much more likely to be successful than the nonsense of being a ‘regulatory superpower.’
There is little doubt that Europe is at a crucial crossroads. The choice is between following the path of being a ponderous and closed legalistic bureaucracy or creating an agile and flexible continent that is at the centre of a vibrant network of shared interests across the globe. A continent that can re-find its industrial prowess fit for a 21st century economy through wide ranging, flexible collaborations wherever they happen to be.
I suggest that only the latter route can allow Europe to reach its stated goal of open strategic autonomy.
